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Abstract—The US Department of Transportation (US-
DOT) issued a proposed rule on January 12th, 2017 to
mandate vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) safety communications
in light vehicles in the US. Cybersecurity and privacy
are major challenges for such a deployment. The au-
thors present a Security Credential Management System
(SCMS) for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communications
in this paper, which has been developed by the Crash
Avoidance Metrics Partners LLC (CAMP) under a Coop-
erative Agreement with the USDOT. This system design is
currently transitioning from research to Proof-of-Concept,
and is a leading candidate to support the establishment of
a nationwide Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for V2X se-
curity. It issues digital certificates to participating vehicles
and infrastructure nodes for trustworthy communications
among them, which is necessary for safety and mobility
applications that are based on V2X communications. The
SCMS supports four main use cases, namely bootstrap-
ping, certificate provisioning, misbehavior reporting and
revocation. The main design goal is to provide both
security and privacy to the largest extent reasonable and
possible. To achieve a reasonable level of privacy in this
context, vehicles are issued pseudonym certificates, and
the generation and provisioning of those certificates are
divided among multiple organizations. Given the large
number of pseudonym certificates per vehicle, one of
the main challenges is to facilitate efficient revocation of
misbehaving or malfunctioning vehicles, while preserving
privacy against attacks from insiders. The proposed SCMS
supports all identified V2X use-cases and certificate types
necessary for V2X communication security.
This paper is based upon work supported by the U.S.
Department of Transportation. Any opinions, findings,
and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this
publication are those of the Authors (”we”) and do not
necessarily reflect the view of the U.S. Department of
Transportation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications between
nearby vehicles in the form of continuous broadcast
of Basic Safety Messages (BSMs) has the potential
to reduce unimpaired vehicle crashes by 80% through
active safety applications [1]. Following a series of field
operational tests, the US Department of Transportation
(USDOT) issued a proposed rule on January 12th, 2017
to mandate the inclusion of V2V technology in light ve-
hicles in the US [2]. Vehicles will broadcast BSMs up to
ten times per second to support V2V safety applications.
BSMs include the senders’ time, position, speed, path
history and other relevant information, and are digitally
signed. The receiver evaluates each message, verifies the
signature, and then decides whether a warning needs to
be displayed to the driver. The correctness and reliability
of BSMs are of prime importance as they directly affect
the effectiveness of safety applications based on them.
To prevent an attacker from inserting false messages,
the sending vehicles digitally sign each BSM, and the
receiving vehicles verify the signature before acting on it.
This approach has been recommended by many different
studies of the system in both Europe and America. [3],
[4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9].
A Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) that facilitates and
manages digital certificates is necessary for building trust
among participants and for proper functioning of the
system. The Security Credential Management System
(SCMS) proposed in this paper implements a PKI with
unique features. This SCMS design is currently a leading
candidate for the V2X security backend in the US. It is
distinguished from a traditional PKI in several aspects.
The two most important aspects being its size (i.e., the
number of devices that it supports) and the balance
among security, privacy, and efficiency. At its full ca-
pacity, it will issue approximately 300 billion certificates
per year1 for 300 million vehicles. To the best of our
knowledge, the PKI whose root is run by the Europay-
1This number may be even greater if pedestrian and cyclist-borne
units become part of the system.
2Mastercard-Visa Consortium (EMVCo) is the largest
extant PKI in the world and issues in the single-digit
billions of certificates per year [10], while the largest cur-
rent government-run PKI, deployed by the Defense Infor-
mation Systems Agency for the Common Access Cards
program [11], is several orders of magnitude smaller
and issues under 10 million certificates per year. At the
core of its design, the proposed SCMS has several novel
cryptographic constructs to provide a high level of secu-
rity and privacy to the users while keeping the system
very efficient. As a result, the presented SCMS design is
significantly different from any previously implemented
PKI. However, it is somewhat similar to the design of the
European C2X PKI [3]. The SCMS was designed with
privacy (both against SCMS insiders and outsiders) being
the highest priority. The SCMS design also provides
efficient methods for requesting certificates and handling
revocation. An early version of the proposed SCMS has
already been implemented, operated and tested in the
Safety Pilot Model Deployment [12], and the design
presented here has been specified and implemented in
the SCMS Proof-of-Concept (PoC) Project and is going
to be deployed for the USDOT’s Connected Vehicle Pilot
Program (CV Pilot Program) [2]. Besides V2V safety
applications, there will also be vehicle-to-infrastructure
and infrastructure-to-vehicle (V2I / I2V) applications2 to
support safety, mobility and environmental applications.
While V2V safety applications are the current focus of
research and deployment in the US, it is essential for
the SCMS to also be able to cover V2I applications.
All applications in the scope of the current research and
the discussion of this paper are limited to single-hop
communication. A wide variety of V2I applications were
analyzed and categorized, and the SCMS design was
updated to support all identified V2I application cate-
gories. This includes infrastructure-originating broadcast
messages (e.g., traffic light announcements) as well as
service announcement and provisioning (e.g., Internet
access). The first application category requires that road-
side equipment (RSE) authenticates broadcast messages,
whereas the second application category requires that
on-board equipment (OBE) in the vehicle establishes a
communication channel to the RSE.
The interface specification of the current version of
the SCMS is available from [13]. The goal of this paper
is to provide an overview of the features of the SCMS
along with rigorous arguments for the appropriateness of
the design decisions made.
2For the sake of a compact representation, we will denote V2I /
I2V applications as V2I applications
II. SCMS DESIGN OVERVIEW
In this section, we present the design of the SCMS by
briefly explaining its components and then discussing the
rationale behind them. We say that an SCMS component
is intrinsically-central, if it can have exactly one distinct
instance for proper functioning. A component is central,
if it is chosen to have exactly one distinct instance
in the considered instantiation of the system. Distinct
instances of a component have different identifiers and
do not share cryptographic materials. While there is only
one SCMS, components that are not central can have
multiple instances. It is assumed that all components
support load balancing if needed. Figure 1 gives an
overview of the overall system architecture. The lines
connecting different SCMS components in Figure 1 are
relationship lines, meaning that in at least one of the
use cases, one component sends information or certifi-
cates to the other. The SCMS was originally designed
for V2V use cases [14], but later extended to support
V2I as well. We will later present the different types
of certificates required to support both V2V and V2I
applications. In the SCMS, there are components that
are included merely for V2V services (e.g., Linkage
Authority), for generic V2X services (e.g., Intermediate
CA), and for combined V2V and V2I services with
separate features for V2V and V2I, respectively (e.g.,
Pseudonym CA). Additionally, there is a dotted line
connecting a device to the SCMS to indicate out-of-band
secure communication. The SCMS can be simplified at
the expense of losing some flexibility, e.g., by making
all the components central.
A. Threat Models and Application Concepts
An (unpublished) risk assessment was performed for
V2V safety applications, which at the moment are being
considered for driver notification only (i.e., not for con-
trol, and not for traffic management or other mobility
applications). For instance, a V2V safety application
might be designed to provide a warning to the driver
in case of an imminent forward collision but such an
application will not be able to control the car based
on the wireless Dedicated Short Range Communication
(DSRC) message input alone. It is assumed that the cryp-
tographic private keys and other security- and privacy-
sensitive materials are stored and used securely in secure
hardware. The risk assessment concluded the major risk
to be that of users deactivating the DSRC system in
their cars in case they receive too many false warnings
due to bogus messages broadcast by malicious devices.
Since V2V is a collaborative technology that requires
participation from a majority of vehicles, the system
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Fig. 1. SCMS Architecture Overview
can be considered a failure if too many nodes were to
deactivate for any reason.
The risk assessment also concluded that there is no
safety-of-life risk from security hacking attacks on the
SCMS, since the result of hacking the SCMS is that an
attacker can either send false messages or create a denial
of service attack on the system (e.g., by widespread
illegitimate revocation of devices). Neither of these hacks
are a direct risk to safety-of-life in the sense of making
collisions more likely than they would be in the absence
of the system given the above assumption about driver
notification applications. However, these hacks would
clearly reduce the safety-of-life benefits of the system,
and as such, the security of the SCMS components is
very important to the system’s success.
Cybersecurity aspects of the vehicle on-board DSRC
computing platform and the SCMS components are
excluded in this paper. However a secure design and
separation of safety-critical systems from the rest of
the vehicle systems are needed. We believe that the
cybersecurity concerns of DSRC units are similar to
other wireless interfaces such as cellular and Bluetooth.
Furthermore, the risk assessment concluded that there
are risks to privacy from security attacks by SCMS
4outsiders as well as insiders. It was thus concluded that
the SCMS must counter / mitigate the following types
of attacks:
• Attacks on end-users’ privacy from SCMS insiders
• Attacks on end-users’ privacy from outside the
SCMS
• Authenticated bogus messages leading to false
warnings
We address the first two items listed above by what
we call “Privacy by Design.” The third item is addressed
by misbehavior detection (to identify misbehaving and
malicious devices) and efficient revocation (to reject
messages from revoked devices) to avoid / minimize
the harm to the system’s trustworthiness. While the
future risk assessments are expected to provide a bet-
ter understanding of the properties and parameters of
the system, the types of certificates to be issued by
the SCMS are considered to be stable at the moment.
For the design of the SCMS, we assume that today’s
cryptographic mechanisms are acceptably secure. This
assumption becomes incorrect if quantum computers
of sufficient scale are developed as they could break
the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm for all
practical curve sizes. The design is modular and flexible,
which allows an upgrade to post-quantum cryptographic
algorithms once such algorithms are widely accepted
and standardized. Note that certain solutions need to
be redesigned, such as the Butterfly key expansion (see
Section IV) since it assumes a cryptographic algorithm
based on the discrete logarithm problem.
1) Privacy by Design: A key goal of the security
system is to protect the privacy of end users, in particular
people driving vehicles for private use. Since most
privately owned vehicles are associated with a single
registered owner, the ability to track the vehicle may be
used to associate vehicle operation with the registered
owner, and so the system is designed to make it hard to
track that vehicle based on its data transmissions. This
is achieved in two ways:
1) For future applications that involve sending unicast
or groupcast (as opposed to broadcast) messages,
the application design should use encryption and
other mechanisms to prevent the identity of parties
to the communication being leaked. Additionally,
those applications should be opt-in so that partic-
ipants have the opportunity to assess the trade-off
between privacy and the value of the service offered
and only use the application if it offers a good trade-
off.3 These privacy-preserving technologies can be
3In practice, it is not clear that end-users are skilled in evaluating
these tradeoffs, but this approach is widely accepted in principle.
implemented without having significant design im-
plications for the SCMS.
2) For applications that involve sending broadcast
messages from end-user vehicles, the privacy-
preserving aspects of the SCMS defined below are
used to make it difficult for eavesdroppers in two
physically distant locations to tell whether BSMs
transmitted at the two locations originated from the
same vehicle.
We identify two types of attackers, inside attackers
and outside attackers. An outside attacker has access to
BSMs but not to any other information such as certifi-
cates that have not been broadcast yet. An inside attacker
has access to BSMs and to other information, such
as information generated during the certificate issuance
process. To maintain privacy against outside attackers,
we propose that end-entity devices are issued with a large
number of certificates (we quantify this in section II-C)
and that they make frequent changes in the certificates
accompanying BSMs (e.g., every 5 minutes, or as spec-
ified in [15] – note that the SCMS supports a range
of strategies and that the change strategy is ongoing
research from a privacy perspective). To provide defense
against inside attackers, the SCMS operations are divided
among its components, and those components are re-
quired to have organizational separation between them
(i.e., each component is run by a separate organization
such that information sharing between organizations can
be controlled). The SCMS is designed such that at least
two of its components need to collude to gain meaningful
information for tracking a device.
We define “unlinkability” informally (cf., Section 4 in
[16] for a more formal definition) as the concept that
the greater the distance in time and space between two
transmissions from the same device, the harder it is to
determine that those two transmissions did in fact come
from the same device.
Unlinkability is not a binary property of the system.
For example, an eavesdropper who is able to record
all messages sent by a vehicle will be able to track
that vehicle by constructing the path indicated by that
vehicle’s BSMs. However, it is a design goal that the
V2V communications system does not increase the risk
that an individual may be tracked.
For purposes of the SCMS described in this paper, the
requirement is that if a vehicle’s broadcast messages (a)
contain data that is unique to the vehicle and (b) can be
linked to a location, the data should change frequently
so that it is extremely difficult for an eavesdropper to
track that vehicle.
Note also that any mobile device may potentially be
tracked in other ways that are not addressed by the
5SCMS (or by any application or data-level mechanism)
and are out of scope of this research, e.g., by RF
fingerprinting [17] or by deploying a large-scale sniffer
network. Additional technical mechanisms and possibly
legal regulations are required to counter such attacks.
2) Misbehavior Detection & Revocation: The SCMS
enforces revocation by periodically distributing a Cer-
tificate Revocation List (CRL) with an updated list of
entries. Devices use the CRL to identify and reject
messages from revoked devices. In addition, the SCMS
maintains internal blacklists of revoked devices to deny
future certificate requests by them. For V2V safety appli-
cations, each device receives a multitude of certificates
so that traditional CRLs would not work in our context
since they would grow too large. We make the revocation
of devices efficient by using a novel concept of linkage
values (cf., Section V-B), which is an extension of
similar ideas presented in [18]. For other applications,
traditional CRLs are supported as well. It is foreseen
that CRL entries will contain some indicator of priority
or severity so that recipients who are limited in storage
capacity can store only the k entries of greatest interest
to them, with the minimum value of k system-wide set
to 10,000. Section VI-F discusses the CRL size and
presents ideas for its dissemination.
Misbehavior detection is the name we give the process
of identifying devices that are either misbehaving or
malfunctioning. It requires local misbehavior detection
in vehicles to recognize anomalies, misbehavior report-
ing by devices to the SCMS, and global misbehavior
detection by the SCMS to analyze misbehavior reports
and to decide which devices to revoke. The local and
global misbehavior detection algorithms are the focus
of on-going work and are not further discussed in this
paper.
B. SCMS Structure
In this section we briefly describe the different SCMS
components. Figure 1 shows components within the
system by their logical roles. An implementation of the
system may combine multiple logical roles within a
single organization with proper separation of the logical
roles. Components marked V/I provide separate V2V
and V2I functionality while components marked ’X’
provide general functionality for the whole V2X system.
Figure 1 shows three pairs of RSEs and OBEs. These
are of the same type and used to illustrate different
use cases of the SCMS. The leftmost pair is used to
demonstrate the connections required for bootstrapping,
the pair in the middle shows the connections required for
certificate provisioning and misbehavior reporting, and
the rightmost pair shows the connections required for
retrieval of the CRL via the CRL Store. Connections are
marked to show if they have to go through the Location
Obscurer Proxy (LOP), which is an anonymizer proxy
and is defined in detail below. In principle, a single LOP
is sufficient to handle all these types of connections. The
content sent over the connections originating from and
ending at the rightmost pair has a special property. Even
if a device is involved only in V2V activities, it may
report misbehavior and receive revocation information
on devices involved in V2I activities (such as an infras-
tructure component) and vice versa. There are two more
special types of connections:
• SCMS communication: secure communication be-
tween components or components and EEs sup-
ported by the SCMS.
• Credentials Chain of Trust: this line shows the
chain of trust for signature verification. Enrollment
certificates are verified against the ECA certificate,
pseudonym, application, and identification certifi-
cates are verified against the PCA certificate, and
certificate revocation lists are verified against the
CRL Generator (part of the MA) certificate.
• Out-of-Band communications: this connection uses
a special channel and will be explained in more
detail in Section V-A.
All online components communicate with each other
using a protected and reliable communication channel,
utilizing protocols such as those from the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) suite [19]. Some components (e.g.,
Root CA, Electors) are air-gap protected. If data is
forwarded via an SCMS component that is not intended
to see that data, it is further encrypted and authenticated
at the application layer (e.g., to encrypt information
generated by the linkage authority that is addressing the
Pseudonym CA but routed via Registration Authority).
The following components are part of the SCMS design:
• SCMS Manager: Ensures efficient and fair operation
of the SCMS, defines organizational and technical
policies, sets guidelines for reviewing misbehavior
and revocation requests to ensure that they are
correct and fair according to procedures.
• Certification Services: Specifies the certification
process and provides information on which types of
devices are certified to receive digital certificates.
• CRL Store (CRLS): A simple pass-through compo-
nent that stores and distributes CRLs.
• CRL Broadcast (CRLB): A simple pass-through
component that broadcasts the current CRL through
RSEs, satellite radio system, etc.
• Device: An end-entity (EE) unit that sends and/or
6receives BSMs, e.g., an OBE, an after-market safety
device (ASD), or an RSE.
• Device Configuration Manager (DCM): Used to
attest to the Enrollment CA (ECA) that a device
is eligible to receive enrollment certificates, and
used as a buffer to provide all relevant configuration
settings and certificates during bootstrapping.
• Electors: Electors represent the center of trust of
the SCMS. Electors sign ballots that either endorse
or revoke an RCA or another elector. Ballots are
distributed to all SCMS components, including EEs,
to establish trust relationships in RCAs and electors.
An elector is established with a self-signed certifi-
cate, and the initial set of electors will be trusted
implicitly by all entities of the system.
• Enrollment CA (ECA): Issues enrollment certifi-
cates, which act as a passport for the device and can
be used to request pseudonym certificates. Different
ECAs may issue enrollment certificates for different
geographic regions, manufacturers, or device types.
• Intermediate CA (ICA): This component serves as
a secondary Certificate Authority to shield the root
CA from traffic and attacks. The Intermediate CA
cert is issued by the root CA.
• Linkage Authority (LA): Generates pre-linkage val-
ues, which are used to form linkage values that go
in the certificates and support efficient revocation.
There are two LAs in the SCMS, referred to as
LA1 and LA2. The splitting prevents the operator
of an LA from linking certificates belonging to a
particular device.
• Location Obscurer Proxy (LOP): Hides the loca-
tion of the requesting device by changing source
addresses, and thus, prevents linking of network
addresses to locations.
• Misbehavior Authority (MA): Processes misbehav-
ior reports to identify potential misbehavior or mal-
functioning by devices, and, if necessary, revokes
and adds them to the CRL. It also initiates the
process of linking a certificate identifier to the cor-
responding enrollment certificates and adding them
to the RA’s internal blacklist. The MA contains
two subcomponents: Global Misbehavior Detection,
which determines which devices are misbehaving;
and CRL Generator (CRLG), which generates, dig-
itally signs and releases the CRL to the outside
world.
• Policy Generator (PG): Maintains and signs updates
of the Global Policy File (GPF), which contains
global configuration information, and the Global
Certificate Chain File (GCCF), which contains all
trust chains of the SCMS.
• Pseudonym CA (PCA): Issues short-term
pseudonym, identification, and application
certificates to devices. Individual PCAs may,
for example, be limited to a particular geographic
region, a particular manufacturer, or a type of
device.
• Registration Authority (RA): Validates and pro-
cesses requests from the device. From those it
creates singular requests for pseudonym certificates
to the PCA. The RA implements mechanisms to
ensure that revoked devices are not issued new
pseudonym certificates, and that devices are not
issued more than one set of certificates for a given
time period. Also the RA provides authenticated
information about SCMS configuration changes to
devices, which may include a component changing
its network address or certificate, or relaying policy
decisions issued by the SCMS Manager. Addition-
ally, when sending pseudonym certificate signing
requests to the PCA or forwarding information to
MA, the RA shuffles the requests/reports to prevent
the PCA from taking the sequence of requests as
an indication for which certificates may belong to
the same batch and the MA from determining the
reporters’ routes.
• Root Certificate Authority (RCA): An RCA is the
root at the top of a certificate chain in the SCMS and
hence a trust anchor. It issues certificates for ICAs
as well as SCMS components like PG and MA.
The RCA is deployed with a self-signed certificate
and trust in a RCA is established by a quorum vote
of the electors. A ballot message that contains in-
structions to add or remove a RCA certificate must
be signed by a quorum of the electors. The ballot
contains the RCA certificate and the electors’ vote.
RCA certificates must be stored in secure storage
that is usually referred to as a Trust Store. An entity
verifies any certificate by verifying all certificates
along the chain from the certificate at hand to the
trusted RCA. This concept is called chain-validation
of certificates, and is the fundamental concept of
any PKI. If the RCA and its private key is not
secure, then the system is potentially compromised.
Due to its importance, an RCA is typically off-line
when not in active use.
Note that the MA, PG, and the SCMS Manager are the
only intrinsically-central components of the SCMS.
C. Certificate Provisioning Model
The focus in this section is on the provisioning of
pseudonym certificates to OBEs. The provisioning of
7other certificate types are either straight-forward, or rep-
resent subsets of the pseudonym certificate provisioning
process. We have developed a pseudonym certificate
provisioning model that balances several conflicting re-
quirements:
• Privacy vs. Size vs. Connectivity: Certificates
should be used only for short periods of time for
privacy reasons. The devices cannot store a very
large number of certificates due to limited memory
storage and its cost in a vehicle environment. On
the other hand, most vehicles cannot establish fre-
quent connectivity to the SCMS to download new
certificates on demand.
• CRL Size and Retrospective Unlinkability: The
SCMS should be able to revoke misbehaving or
malfunctioning devices4, but putting all valid cer-
tificates of a device on the CRL would make it very
large. We have designed a mechanism to revoke
a large number of certificates efficiently without
revealing certificates that were used by the device
before it started misbehaving.
• Certificate Waste vs. Sybil Attack: Certificates
must be changed periodically for privacy reasons.
One option is to have a large number of certifi-
cates, each valid one after the other for a short
period of time. This would result in a large number
of unused certificates5. Another option is to have
multiple certificates valid simultaneously for longer
time periods. This would enable masquerading as
multiple devices by compromising a single device
(the so-called Sybil attack [20]) [21].
In the SCMS model used for Safety Pilot Model
Deployment [12], a certificate was valid for a specific
5-minute period, which would correspond to 105, 120
certificates per year. Given the connectivity constraints,
in full deployment a device may need up to 3 years’
worth of certificates, which would amount to more
than 300, 000 certificates. This approach is prohibitively
expensive in terms of automotive-grade storage require-
ments on the device. We studied different variants of this
model, but none of them offer a good balance among
all the properties listed above. Instead, we recommend
to adopt a model originating with the CAR 2 CAR
4CRLs can be avoided if devices were required to request new
certificates frequently such that misbehaving devices could be refused
new certificates. This would require frequent connectivity to the
SCMS, which may not be a reasonable assumption at least under
current circumstances.
5Based on the US Census Bureau’s annual American Community
Survey for 2011, the average daily commute time is less than 1 hour,
so more than 95% of certificates would be wasted, if each certificate
had a unique validity period.
Communication Consortium (C2C-CC) [3], with certain
modifications to suit our requirements.
In the C2C-CC model, multiple certificates are valid
in a given time period, the certificate validity period
is days rather than minutes, and the certificate usage
pattern can vary from device to device, e.g., a device
could use a certificate for 5 minutes after start-up, then
switch to another certificate, and use that for a longer
time-period before changing certificates again, or even
until the end of the journey. This model offers enough
flexibility to find a good balance among our different
requirements except “CRL size and retrospective unlink-
ability”, which we address by our construct of linkage
values (cf. Section V-B). In particular, our proposal is
to use a model originating with the C2C-CC with the
following parameter values:
• Certificate validity time period: 1 week
• Number of certificates valid simultaneously (batch
size): minimum 20
• Overall covered time-span: 1− 3 years
These parameters can be further refined by the SCMS
Manager so that devices are compatible with each other.
Two points are worth noting:
1) This model provides a reasonable level of privacy
against tracking while keeping the storage require-
ments low due to a significantly higher utilization
of certificates (i.e., far fewer certificates are wasted
compared to the Safety Pilot model). Certificates
of a device that does not use all its certificates
in a week (e.g., say a device only uses 13 of the
provided 20 certificates in a given week) cannot be
linked. Moreover, if a device re-uses certificates, it
is linkable only within a week.
2) The model allows for an easy topping-off mecha-
nism of pseudonym certificates. We have designed
a mechanism such that devices do not need to
explicitly request new certificates but the SCMS
will automatically issue new certificates throughout
the life-time of the device, until the device stops
picking-up certificates for an extended period of
time. The RA will provide the certificates in batches
worth one week (e.g., as a zip file), and devices
will download the batches using TCP/IP connection.
The batches will be organized in files, named using
device information and time period. The RA will
provide information when to expect new certificate
batches (e.g., once per month), and the device will
have full control over what and how much they
download, when they download, and they can also
resume interrupted downloads.
8III. CERTIFICATE TYPES
Within the overall Connected Vehicle system there
are different application types which may have different
requirements for certificate management. A complete
specification of the SCMS therefore should include de-
termining how many different certificate management
process flows need to be supported. We define certificates
to be of the same certificate type if they are issued
following identical process flows. Based on an analysis
of 119 DSRC-based applications, it was determined that
five end-entity certificate types satisfied all use cases:
• OBE enrollment certificates: enrollment certificates
are provided during bootstrap and they are used
later to request message signing and/or encryption
certificates.
• RSE enrollment certificates: RSE enrollment certifi-
cates are the equivalent to OBE enrollment certifi-
cates for RSEs.
• OBE pseudonym certificates: pseudonym certifi-
cates provide pseudonymity, unlinkability, and effi-
cient revocation of a multitude of certificates. This
is accomplished by using security features such as
shuffling, linkage values, butterfly key expansion,
and encryption of certificates by PCA to the OBE
in order to provide protection against an insider
attack at the RA. This type of certificate is used
to sign basic safety message (BSM) broadcasts
by OBEs. Further, this type of certificate is used
for authorization purposes when unlinkability is
required. In the case of BSM broadcast, pseudonym
certificates might be attached to each signed BSM
to increase the ability of a receiver to verify each
received BSM, or they might be attached to a few
signed BSMs only [22].
• OBE identification certificates: identification cer-
tificates are used when a device needs to identify
itself. This type of certificate does not provide
pseudonymity nor unlinkability. During creation of
OBE pseudonym certificates, the SCMS applies
privacy preserving mechanisms such as shuffling
and encryption by the PCA to the OBE. These
mechanisms are not necessarily used when creating
OBE identification certificates. However, butterfly
key expansion is used to allow for continuous
generation of certificates. Identification certificates
are used for authorization purposes, such as signed
authorization messages of an OBE to an RSE to
gain access to a barred road.
• RSE application certificates: RSEs use these certifi-
cates to sign broadcast messages, to sign service
announcement messages, and optionally to provide
an encryption key that an OBE can use to send en-
crypted data. Note that this is the only EE certificate
type which includes an encryption key.
The types of certificates provided by the SCMS are
listed in Table I, along with a list of features. The table
shows required features of each certificate type, where
an ’X’ means that a certificate type needs to implement
that feature. The features are as follows:
• Shuffle: Shuffling is performed in the RA and is
useful only in combination with Butterfly keys
that are described below. Shuffling makes sure that
PCA cannot learn which certificates are assigned
to which devices. Shuffling is required to provide
privacy against SCMS insiders.
• On broadcast CRL if revoked: certificate informa-
tion of this certificate type can be added to a CRL
that allows easy recognition of revoked certificates.
Enrollment certificates and OBE identification cer-
tificates are never distributed via broadcast CRL but
they are blacklisted at the RA so that they cannot
get new certificates.
• Simultaneous validity for given PSID: PSIDs [9] are
embedded in certificates and the message payload.
They describe application types and enable the
receiver to parse a received message. For OBE
pseudonym certificates, we allow that more than
one certificate is valid per time period, as described
in Section II-C (e.g., 20 certificates are valid per
week).
• Linkage Values: Linkage values are embedded in
certificates and they allow for efficient revocation,
cf. Section V-C.
• Continuous Generation: The SCMS will continu-
ously generate certificates once an initial request
has been made. This feature allows for devices to
quickly obtain certificates once a connection to the
SCMS is available and facilitates top-up strategies.
This feature is particularly useful if a multitude of
certificates is required.
• Issuing certificates for multiple time periods: The
SCMS will in one session issue certificates that are
valid for more than one time period. For instance,
the SCMS might issue certificates each valid for one
week, but altogether the certificates cover a period
of several years.
• Pseudonymity: A pseudonym certificate does not
contain any real-world identifier.
• Misbehavior reporting: Devices provide misbehav-
ior reports to the SCMS in order to enable the
SCMS to detect misbehavior and revoke misbehav-
ing devices. All certificate types that are broadcast
9over-the-air can be included in a misbehavior report.
• Non-traceability: A device receives multiple cer-
tificates such that it can use different identities at
different times. This raises complexity to trace a
device, i.e., to determine whether two broadcast
messages originate from the same device based on
the embedded cryptographic material.
• Encryption key: Besides the public key for signing,
the certificate holds a second public key to encrypt
messages to the certificate holder.
Table I shows all types of certificates along with the
features they provide. Note the following remarks.
• Due to the large amount of OBE pseudonym cer-
tificates per device, linkage values are mandatory
for this type. Linkage values are not used in OBE
identification certificates since those certificates are
only used for V2I applications and since RSE can
store large CRLs.
• We suggest the non-traceability requirement for
OBE pseudonym certificates only.
IV. BUTTERFLY KEY EXPANSION
The typical process for a device to request certificates
from a PKI would be to generate a private/public key
pair. The device creates a certificate signing request
(CSR) including the public key and provide the CSR
to the PKI over a secure channel. The PKI’s CA will
then sign the certificate and provide it to the requester.
For OBE pseudonym certificates, such an approach
has disadvantages as thousands of public keys would
need to be generated in the device and then sent to
the SCMS. Butterfly keys are a novel cryptographic
construction to overcome this disadvantage by allowing
an OBE to request an arbitrary number of certificates;
each certificate with a different signing key and each
encrypted with a different encryption key. This is done
using a request that contains only one signing public key
seed, one encryption public key seed, and two expansion
functions. Certificates are encrypted by the PCA to the
OBE to avoid the RA being able to relate certificate
content with a certain OBE. Without butterfly keys, the
OBE would have to send a unique signing key and
a unique encryption key for each certificate. Butterfly
keys reduce upload size, allowing requests to be made
when there is only suboptimal connectivity, and also
reduce the work to be done by the requester to calculate
the keys. Further, butterfly keys significantly simplify
the topping-off mechanism described in Section II-C.
Butterfly expansion for signing key is described below
for elliptic curve cryptography, but it could easily be
adapted to any discrete-logarithm-type hardness assump-
tion. Butterfly expansion for encryption key is identical
to that of the signing key, except for a minor difference
in the way the inputs to AES are derived, see below
for more details. In the following, we denote integers
by lower-case characters and curve points by upper-case
characters. The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
is basically the statement: Given P and A = aP , but
not a, it is hard to compute the value of a [23]. Butterfly
keys make use of this as follows. There is an agreed base
point, called G, of some order l. The caterpillar keypair
is an integer, a, and a point A = aG. The certificate
requester provides to RA the value A and an expansion
function, fk(ι), which is a pseudo-random permutation
in the integers mod l. Note that ι is a simple counter
iterated by the RA.
In the current design the expansion function for sign-
ing keys, fk(ι), which is used to generate points on the
NIST curve NISTp256 [24], is defined as
fk(ι) = f
int
k (ι) mod l, where (1)
1) f intk (ι) is the big-endian integer representation of
(AESk(x+ 1)⊕ (x+ 1)) ‖
(AESk(x+ 2)⊕ (x+ 2)) ‖
(AESk(x+ 3)⊕ (x+ 3)),
(2)
2) x+ 1, x+ 2, and x+ 3 are obtained by simply in-
crementing x by 1 each time, e.g., if x = 01 . . . 00,
then x+ 1 = 01 . . . 01, x+ 2 = 01 . . . 10, x+ 3 =
01 . . . 11,
3) 128-bit input x for AES is derived from time period
ι = (i, j) as:
(
032‖i‖j‖032
)
.
The expansion function for encryption keys is also
defined as above except x is derived as:
(
132‖i‖j‖032
)
.
Note that in the above definition, AES is used in
the Davies-Meyer6 mode, as fk does not need to be
invertible. Also, AES is applied 3 times to ensure that
the outputs of fk are uniformly distributed with negligible
biases, if any.
Now RA can generate up to 2128 cocoon public keys as
Bι = A+fk(ι)∗G, where the corresponding private keys
will be bι = a+ fk(ι), so the public keys are known to
the RA but the private keys are known only to the OBE.
The RA includes the cocoon public keys in the certificate
requests sent to the PCA.
If these expanded public keys were used unaltered by
the PCA, the RA, which knows which public keys come
from a single request, could recognize those public keys
in the certificates and track the OBE. To avoid this, for
6In the Davies-Meyer mode, the output of the function is XORed
with the input to generate the final output.
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each cocoon public key Bι, the PCA generates a random
cι and obtains Cι = cιG. The butterfly public key which
is included in the certificate is Bι+Cι. The PCA returns
both the certificate and the private key reconstruction
value c to the RA to be returned to the OBE7. To prevent
the RA from working out which certificate corresponds
to a given public key in a request, the certificate and the
reconstruction value cι are encrypted to the OBE. The
OBE will update its private keys resulting in b′ι with
b′ι = bι + cι. To prevent the PCA from knowing which
certificates go to which OBE, each certificate must be
encrypted with a different key. The encryption keys are
also generated with the butterfly key approach: the OBE
provides a caterpillar encryption public keyH = hG, the
RA expands it to cocoon public encryption keys Jι =
H+fe(ι)G, and the PCA uses these keys to encrypt the
response. Figure 2 provides an overview of the butterfly
key expansion concept for signing keys.
A. Security of Butterfly Keys
In this section, we briefly discuss the security of
butterfly keys. We say that the above construction of
butterfly keys is secure, if any efficient (i.e., polynomial-
time) adversary has only a negligible (i.e., smaller than
any polynomial) chance of winning in the following
game: adversary receives a polynomial number of but-
terfly public keys (i.e., (A + fk(1) ∗ G + c1 ∗ G), (A +
fk(2) ∗ G + c2 ∗ G), ..., (A + fk(q) ∗ G + cq ∗ G)), and
7This description covers explicit certificates, i.e., certificates that
include the public key explicitly. In fact, the SCMS as currently
implemented issues implicit certificates [25] for devices. The implicit
certificate generation process inherently changes the public key in a
way that leaves input and output uncorrelatable by the RA and is
consistent with the motivation for butterfly keys.
it needs to figure out at least one of the butterfly private
keys (i.e., a + fk(x) + cx for any 1 ≤ x ≤ q). As fk
is assumed to be a pseudo-random permutation, it is
hard for any polynomial-time adversary to distinguish
fk’s outputs from truly random values. Hence, we can
simplify (without any loss of generality) the above
security definition as follows.
Security Definition (Informal). The above construc-
tion of butterfly keys is said to be secure, if any efficient
adversary that is given a polynomial number of butterfly
public keys (i.e., (A+b1∗G), (A+b2∗G), ..., (A+bq∗G),
where b1, b2, ..., bq are randomly chosen) has only a
negligible probability of correctly guessing one of the
butterfly private keys (i.e., a+ bx for any 1 ≤ x ≤ q).
Theorem (Informal). The construction of butterfly
keys is secure assuming that the elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem is hard.
Proof. We prove the above theorem by contradic-
tion. We first assume that the construction of butter-
fly keys is not secure (i.e., there exists a polynomial-
time adversary, henceforth butterfly-keys-adversary, with
a non-negligible probability of winning the security
game), then using this adversary we construct an-
other polynomial-time adversary, henceforth discrete-
log-adversary, that solves the elliptic curve discrete log-
arithm problem with a non-negligible probability, al-
though with a polynomial loss in the winning probability.
However, as the theorem says the latter can not be true,
the construction of butterfly keys must be secure.
The discrete-log-adversary is given a pair of curve
points (P,A), and it needs to output a, s.t. A = aP . It
randomly selects q integers b1, b2, ..., bq , and using them
generates q butterfly public keys (A+ b1 ∗P ), (A+ b2 ∗
P ), ..., (A+bq ∗P ), and gives them to the butterfly-keys-
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Fig. 2. Butterfly Key Expansion Concept
adversary. When the butterfly-keys-adversary returns its
response c, the discrete-log-adversary uses c to compute
its own response as follows: pick a random number from
1 through q, say y, now the response is c− by.
It is clear that the discrete-log-adversary runs in
polynomial-time if the butterfly-keys-adversary runs in
polynomial-time. It remains to be shown that the winning
probability of discrete-log-adversary is non-negligible.
To this end, we note that if the butterfly-keys-adversary
wins, then c = a + bx for some 1 ≤ x ≤ q. Since,
y is picked at random from 1 through q after the
butterfly-keys-adversary has responded, y = x with
probability 1/q, and hence c − by = a with proba-
bility 1/q times the winning probability of butterfly-
keys-adversary. Therefore, if the winning probability of
butterfly-keys-adversary is non-negligible, so is that of
discrete-log-adversary. 
V. DEVICE BOOTSTRAPPING AND CERTIFICATE
PROVISIONING
The SCMS supports four main use cases: device
bootstrapping, certificate provisioning, misbehavior re-
porting, and global misbehavior detection & revoca-
tion. Bootstrapping and certificate provisioning will be
presented in this section, and misbehavior reporting,
detection and revocation will be described in the next
section.
A. Device Bootstrapping
Bootstrapping is executed at the start of the life cycle
of a device. It equips the device with all the informa-
tion required to communicate with the SCMS and with
other devices. It is required that correct information is
provided to the device during bootstrapping, and that
the CAs issue certificates only to certified devices. Any
bootstrapping process is acceptable that results in this
information being established securely.
The bootstrapping process includes a device, the
DCM, the ECA and the certification services component.
We assume that the DCM has established communication
channels with other SCMS components, such as the ECA
or the policy generator, and that it will communicate
with the device to be bootstrapped using an out-of-
band channel in a secure environment. Bootstrapping
consists of two operations: initialization and enrollment.
Initialization is the process by which the device obtains
certificates it needs to be able to trust received messages.
Enrollment is the process by which the device obtains an
enrollment certificate that it will need to sign messages
to the SCMS.
Information received in the initialization process in-
cludes (1) the certificates of all electors, all root CAs,
and possibly of intermediate CAs as well as PCAs, and
(2) the certificates of the misbehavior authority, policy
generator, and the CRL generator to send encrypted
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misbehavior reports and verify received policy files and
CRLs.
In the enrollment process, information required to
actively participate is sent to the device. This includes
(1) the enrollment certificate, (2) the certificate of the
ECA, and (3) the certificate of the RA and information
necessary to connect to the RA. During the enrollment
process, the certification services provide the DCM with
information about device models which are eligible
for enrollment. This requires that the DCM receives
trustworthy information about the type of device to
be enrolled. Figure 3 shows an exemplary enrollment
process.
B. Overview of Certificate Provisioning
The certificate provisioning process is most complex
for OBE pseudonym certificates in order to protect end-
user privacy and to minimize the required computational
effort on the resource-constrained device. In the follow-
ing we focus on the pseudonym certificate provisioning
of OBE pseudonym certificates since the certificate pro-
visioning of other certificate types is a straight-forward
subset in terms of functionality. The OBE pseudonym
certificate provisioning process is illustrated in Figure 5,
and is designed to protect privacy from inside and outside
attackers. The SCMS is designed to ensure that no
single component knows or creates a complete set of
data that would enable tracking of a vehicle. The RA
knows the enrollment certificate of a device that requests
pseudonym certificates, but even though the pseudonym
certificates are delivered to the device by the RA, it
is not able to read the content of those certificates;
the PCA creates each individual pseudonym certificate,
but it does not know the recipient of those certificates,
nor does it know which certificates went to the same
device. The LAs generate hash-chain values that are
masked and embedded in each certificate, and unmasked
by publishing a secret linkage seed pair to efficiently
revoke all future device certificates. However, a single
LA is not able to track devices by linking certificates or
to revoke a device, but both LAs, the PCA, and the RA
need to collaborate for the revocation process. Privacy
mechanisms in the SCMS include:
• Obscuring Physical Location. The LOP obscures
the physical location of an end-entity device to hide
it from the RA and the MA.
• Hiding Certificates from RA. The butterfly key
expansion process ensures that the public key seeds
in requests cannot be correlated with the resulting
certificates. Details were given in Section IV. En-
crypting the certificates to the device prevents the
RA from relating certificates with a device.
• Hiding Receiver and Certificate Linkage from
PCA. The RA expands incoming requests using
Butterfly keys and then splits these requests into
requests for single certificates, and shuffles requests
of all devices before sending them to the PCA.
This prevents the PCA from learning whether two
different certificates went to the same device, which
would violate our privacy goal by enabling the PCA
to link certificates. The RA should have configura-
tion parameters for shuffling, e.g., the POC shuffles
either 10,000 requests or a day’s worth of requests,
whatever is reached first.
C. Linkage Values
For any set of pseudonym certificates provided to a
device, the SCMS inserts linkage values in certificates
that can be used to revoke all of the certificates with
validity equal to or later than some time i. These linkage
values are computed by XORing the pre-linkage values
generated by the Linkage Authorities LA1 and LA2. The
LAs can generate the pre-linkage values in advance.
Figure 4 provides an overview of the linkage value
generation.
Let la id1, la id2 be 32-bit identity strings associated
with LA1, LA2, respectively. For a set of certificates,
first the LA1 (resp., the LA2) picks a random 128-bit
string called the initial linkage seed ls1(0) (resp., ls2(0)),
then for each time period (e.g., a week) i > 0 calculates
the linkage seed ls1(i)← Hu (la id1 ‖ ls1(i− 1)) (resp.,
ls2(i) ← Hu(la id2 ‖ ls2(i − 1))). In this coherence,
Hu(m) denotes the u most significant bytes of the SHA-
256 hash output on m, and a‖b denotes concatenation
of bit-strings a and b. We suggest to use u = 16.
Note that the linkage seeds (i.e., hash chains) created
by the LAs have the property that it is easy to calculate
forward (i.e., ls(i) from ls(i−1)) but it is computationally
infeasible to calculate backward (i.e., ls(i−1) from ls(i)).
Now pre-linkage values are calculated by means of a
pseudorandom function. We choose to implement this
by an encryption function, such as AES, in the Davies-
Meyer mode. Each LA encrypts the linkage seeds as
plvx(i, j) ← [E(lsx(i), (la idx‖j)) ⊕ (la idx‖j)]v , x ∈
{1, 2}, where E(k,m) is the AES encryption of m with
key k, a⊕ b is the exclusive-OR of bit-strings a, b, and
[a]v denotes the v significant bytes of bit-string a. We
suggest flexible use of v to account for the number
of deployed devices and potential weaknesses of the
underlying cryptographic primitives in terms of collision
resistance. Currently, v = 9 appears to suffice. The value
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Fig. 3. Exemplary Enrollment Process
i denotes a time period (e.g., a week) and j denotes
certificates within a time period (e.g., 20 certificates per
week). Each LA calculates pre-linkage values in the
same manner, but each with randomly selected initial
seed. We denote the resulting values as plv1 and plv2.
In order to select a specific linkage chain from an LA,
we use Linkage Chain Identifiers (LCI)s. An LCI is the
initial linkage seed ls1(0) or ls2(0) that LA1 or LA2,
respectively, encrypts to itself, e.g., E(pk1, ls1(0)), where
pk1 is the public key of LA1.
Pre-linkage values are encrypted (individually) for the
PCA but sent to the RA for association with a certificate
request. The PCA XORs the pre-linkage values to obtain
the linkage value lv = plv1 ⊕ plv2. Similar processing
is required when the CRL is processed by a device. The
details of this process and the information that needs to
be published are presented in Section VII.
1) Hiding Linkage Information: The PCA computes
the linkage value to be included in a certificate by
XORing together the two pre-linkage values from the
LAs, which are generated independently by the two LAs
and encrypted for the PCA to prevent the RA from
colluding with one of the LAs and mapping pre-linkage
values to linkage values. Therefore, no single component
is able to link pseudonym certificates of a single device.
2) Response Encryption: The PCA creates singular
certificates which are collated by the RA and made
available to the device. To prevent the RA from seeing
multiple certificates belonging to the same device, the
PCA encrypts each singular certificate to the device.
The PCA and the device use the butterfly key expansion
process to encrypt each certificate with a different key.
3) Linkage Value Length: The linkage values and pre-
linkage values are chosen to be 9 bytes in length. This
length is appropriate because the unique identifier is
not just linkage value but (i, linkage value); this length
ensures negligible probability that two devices use the
same linkage value in the same time period. Consider
that there are 2.5 ∗ 108 cars and each has on average
40 certificates per linkage period (one week), then in
any linkage period identified by a given i, there are
1010 ≈ 233 linkage values in use. The relevant quantity
when calculating collision probabilities is the number of
pairs of values, which in this case is about 266. With
72-bit linkage values, this means that the chance of a
collision between two linkage values is about 2−6. In
other words, there will be about one collision every
64 linkage periods, which with linkage period length
of a week means about one linkage value collision in
the system of 250 million vehicles every year. This is
small and in addition a linkage value collision matters
only in case of a revocation, i.e., if a linkage value was
assigned to a revoked device. Assuming revocation rates
below 1%, this implies that a linkage value collision
that actually makes a difference will happen less than
once every 100 years. This could be reduced further by
increasing the size of the linkage value. However, that
would increase the size of all certificates, which would
increase channel congestion.
D. Misbinding Attacks
In this type of attack, an attacker Mallory misuses
the public-key of her target Alice. Mallory reads Alice’s
public key and requests a certificate over that public
key from the SCMS. While Mallory does not know the
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Fig. 4. Creation of Linkage Values
corresponding private key, she can still mount attacks
in which she gets a message signed by Alice’s private
key and then attaches her certificate rather than Alice’s.
In the context of the BSM this is not a particularly
significant attack, but SCMS-issued certificates could be
used for a wide range of applications and in some of
those applications the attack could have a greater impact.
It is therefore useful to consider countermeasures.
The countermeasure chosen is the one specified in [9]:
when a message is signed, the hash that is signed is
calculated over both the message itself and the certificate.
This binds the hash to the certificate and provides
assurance that the certificate provided with the message
is in fact the certificate that the sender intended to be
used. Since this certificate misbinding attack is only
of any use if the false certificate is different from the
true one, this approach of including the hash completely
eliminates this attack.
Other mechanisms were considered. For example, this
attack is possible only if the certificate request messages
do not provide proof of possession; and this is the case
in the SCMS, since operational certificate requests are
not signed with the key for the certificate to be issued
but with the key for the enrollment certificate. Signing
certificate requests with the enrollment certificate is a key
part of the trust architecture of this system and so cannot
be changed, but we considered signing the certificate
request with both the enrollment certificate and the
private key for the certificate to be issued. However,
this has shortcomings compared to hashing the certificate
into the message. First, if a requester were to legitimately
request two certificates for the same key pair, misbinding
would still be possible. Second, hashing the certificate
into the message allows the receiver to determine for
sure that the certificate is the one intended, rather than
relying on the CA enforcing a particular mechanism
for certificate request. For these reasons we determined
that proof-of-possession, although it is widely used in
internet protocols, does not add significant value in our
system and that including the certificate in the message
hash is the only countermeasure necessary.
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E. Detailed Description of Pseudonym Certificate Pro-
visioning Process
In the following, we present a detailed step-by-step
description of the pseudonym certificate provisioning
process, illustrated in Figure 5.
• Step 1. The device creates a request by generating
butterfly key seeds, signing the request with the
device’s enrollment certificate, and encrypting the
request to the RA. The device then sends the request
to the RA via LOP. The LOP functions as a pass-
through device for requests. The LOP obscures the
device’s identifiers (e.g., IP address) by replacing
these identifiers with its own in transit, such that
the request appears to the RA as coming from the
LOP. The functionality of the LOP is very similar
to the masquerading feature implemented in many
Internet routers.
• Step 2. The RA decrypts the request, checks if the
signature and the device’s enrollment certificate are
valid and that the latter is not revoked. Further, it
checks if this is the only request by the device. If
all checks succeed, the RA sends an acknowledg-
ment to the device, and performs the butterfly key
expansion as explained in Section IV. Otherwise,
the request is denied. The RA collects several such
requests from different devices along with the sets
of pre-linkage values received from the LAs. Once
enough such requests are available, the RA shuffles
the expanded individual requests to the PCA.
Note that during pre-generation of additional
pseudonym certificates, the RA requests pre-linkage
values from each of the LAs for a particular initial
linkage seed that is associated with that device.
This can be accomplished using the LCI for the
corresponding linkage chain.
• Step 3. The RA sends requests for pseudonym
certificates to the PCA, one certificate per request,
where each request consists of a to-be-signed cer-
tificate, a response encryption public key, and an
encrypted pre-linkage value from each of the LAs
(plv1(i, j),plv2(i, j)) , and the hash of the RA-to-
PCA pseudonym certificate request.
• Step 4. The PCA decrypts the pre-linkage val-
ues and computes the linkage value lv(i, j) =
plv1(i, j)⊕plv2(i, j). It then adds the linkage value
to the to-be-signed certificate, and implicitly signs
it to create a pseudonym certificate and a private
key reconstruction value. Subsequently, it encrypts
both the pseudonym certificate and the private key
reconstruction value, using the response encryption
public key.
• Step 5. The PCA signs the encrypted packet gener-
ated in step 4 above, and sends it to the RA. Signing
the encrypted packet provides a guarantee to the
device that the PCA encrypted the packet for the
device. This prevents a man-in-the-middle attack
where an insider at the RA substitutes the valid
response encryption key with another key for which
the RA knows the private key, and thus the RA
may be able to see the contents of the pseudonym
certificate including the linkage value.
• Step 6. The RA collects the encrypted pseudonym
certificate and corresponding private key reconstruc-
tion value for one week and bundles them for a
given device. These bundles are called batch. The
RA provides the batches to the device for download.
For revocation purposes, the SCMS components
involved in the pseudonym certificate provisioning
store different information corresponding to a given
pseudonym certificate as listed in Table II.
TABLE II
INFORMATION STORED BY SCMS COMPONENTS
Component Stored Information
LA Initial linkage seed, pre-linkage value
PCA
Encrypted pre-linkage values from both
LAs and their corresponding (i, j) val-
ues, linkage value, certificate, and hash
of RA-to-PCA pseudonym certificate re-
quest
RA
Enrollment certificate and its valid-
ity period, hash value of RA-to-PCA
pseudonym certificate request
VI. REMOVING MISBEHAVING DEVICES
The removal of misbehaving devices in an efficient
manner is an essential design objective. We separate the
removal of misbehaving devices into (1) reporting mis-
behavior, (2) globally detect misbehavior, (3) investigate
misbehavior, and (4) revoke a misbehaving EE.
A. Misbehavior Reporting
V2V messages from misbehaving or defective devices
can contain false or misleading information. We distin-
guish between intentional and unintentional misbehav-
ior, where the latter covers all faults and error cases
of devices. In both cases it is important that benign
participants neglect messages from misbehaving devices.
One approach to accomplish this is to run misbehavior
16
DB
DB
DB
DB
seeds and pre-linkage values.
Store: pre-linkage
LA1
RA
LOP
Device
Store: device’s enrollment
certificate and hash of all
RA-to-PCA certificate requests.
PCA
Store: pre-linkage values,
linkage value, (i, j), certificate,
and hash of RA-to-PCA request.
Pre-linkage values plv
1
(i, j), plv
2
(i, j)
Step 3. Request Singular Certificates:
Step 1. Create Request
Include two caterpillar keys: A, J , fk(·), fe(·)
Sign and encrypt to RA
Collect for shuffling
Butterfly key expansion
Step 2. Handle Request at RA
Validate
Butterfly key pair (Bι, Jι)
Step 6. Bundle at the RA
Collate certificates for a device
Make bundle available to device (e.g., by download)
Step 5. Provide Singular Certificates:
Step 4. Create at PCA:
Linkage value lv(i, j)
LA2
plv
2
(·, ·)
plv
1
(·, ·)
Shuffle Collate
Hash of RA-to-PCA certificate request
Signed pseudonym certificate
Encrypted to the device and signed by PCA
Private key reconstruction value cx
x-th singular certificate, x ∈ {1, . . . , q}
Timing information i
Fig. 5. Certificate Provisioning
detection algorithms on the device (local misbehavior
detection) in order to identify misbehaving nodes. A
second approach is to report potentially misbehaving
devices to the SCMS. The SCMS will run misbehavior
detection algorithms and then inform all participants
about certificates which are no longer trustworthy. In
the misbehavior reporting process, devices will send
misbehavior reports to the MA via the RA . The RA
which sits behind the LOP will not know the source
IP. The RA will combine and shuffle the reports from
multiple reporters to prevent the MA from tracking
the reporter’s path based on the reports. The format
of a misbehavior report is not fully defined yet, but a
report will include reported (suspicious and alert-related)
BSMs, associated pseudonym certificates, as well as
the reporter’s pseudonym certificate and corresponding
signature from the time the report was created (compare
preliminary EE-MA interface [26]). A report will be
encrypted by the reporter to the MA. In the following,
we will first focus on the process of Global Misbe-
havior Detection and Revocation for the case of OBE
pseudonym certificates. Subsequently, we describe the
processes required for other types of certificates.
B. Global Misbehavior Detection
The global misbehavior detection is the overall pro-
cess to identify potential misbehavior in the system,
investigate suspicious activity, and if confirmed, to re-
voke misbehaving EEs. The Misbehavior Detection pro-
cess is owned and executed by the MA. A number
of Global misbehavior detection algorithms have been
developed as part of another research project. Those
will be integrated to the current SCMS design and be
tested in various CV Pilot activities. However, as the
V2X landscape continues to evolve and new threats and
forms of misbehavior are discovered, it’s expected that
additional algorithms will continue to be developed and
implemented over time. Misbehavior Detection methods
and algorithm development are seen as iterative tasks
that will continue throughout the lifetime of the SCMS.
One example of misbehavior, however primitive, would
be a bad actor who intentionally projects the position
of the sending vehicle 3 meters to the left (or right for
right hand drive countries). These messages would cause
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alerts to the oncoming traffic which would be detected as
possible misbehavior. The receiving vehicle would store
these messages (assuming multiple) and put them into
a MB report, along with all defined data and details.
This report will be encrypted and sent to the RA for
submission to the MA. As other vehicles also detect this
misbehaving vehicle they would also send MB reports
to the MA. As the number of reports grow it would
trigger the MB detection algorithms and kick off the
misbehavior investigation process possibly leading to a
device revocation.
It’s worth noting that this type of misbehavior could
possibly be detected locally by the sending vehicle.
OEMs, and EE device developers are expected to tackle
misbehavior, at the device level, from many angles
to detect and prevent bad messages from being sent.
Misbehavior Detection requires that the MA be able to
learn whether multiple misbehavior reports point to the
same device. In order to revoke a device’s certificates,
the MA needs to collect information that determines
the revocation information to include in a CRL for
distribution. Additionally, the MA needs to provide the
RA with information required to perform blacklisting.
The following actions are required from the components:
1) The MA, PCA and one of the LAs have to collab-
orate to reconstruct linkage information.
2) The MA, PCA, RA, and both the LAs have to col-
laborate to produce external revocation information
for the CRL.
3) The MA, PCA and the RA have to collaborate to
determine the enrollment certificate of the misbe-
having device, which will be added to the RA’s
blacklist.
Step 1 is executed as part of the Misbehavior Inves-
tigation to determine whether an EE, or a set of EEs,
did indeed misbehave. After an EE has been marked
as misbehaving, Steps 2 and 3 are executed as part of
Revocation to determine the information that is included
in the CRL and that is added to the internal blacklist.
C. Misbehavior Investigation
Misbehavior Investigation is the task to determine
whether suspicious activities are indeed due to misbe-
havior, and to identify misbehaving EEs. This process is
initiated by the Misbehavior Detection algorithm running
in MA, and it depends on PCA and an LA. This
separation introduces a checks and balances into the
system, and we strongly recommend a mechanism that
PCA and LA require some kind of proof of MA (e.g., a
particular authorizing digital signature of each request),
and PCA and LA limit the number of requests as well
as the amount of information returned to MA. Finally,
we strongly recommend that PCA and LA keep records
of every request, and that these log files are regularly
audited.
The Misbehavior Investigation process reveals in a
controlled manner linkage information of EEs for which
two (or more) input certificates were generated for the
same EE. In the following, we present a detailed step-
by-step description of this process. Note that Steps 1 and
2 are included for completeness and cover Misbehavior
Reporting Global Misbehavior Detection, respectively.
• Step 1. The MA receives misbehavior reports,
including a reported pseudonym certificate with
linkage value lv = plv1 ⊕ plv2.
• Step 2. The MA runs global misbehavior detection
algorithms to determine which reported pseudonym
certificates might be of interest, i.e., for which
pseudonym certificates linkage information needs to
be retrieved.
• Step 3. The MA makes a request (signed) to the
PCA to map the linkage values lv of the iden-
tified pseudonym certificates to the corresponding
encrypted pre-linkage values (plv1,plv2) from the
PCA’s database. The PCA returns the encrypted pre-
linkage values to MA.
• Step 4. The MA makes a request to either LA1
or LA2 in order to find out whether two instances
of encrypted plv1 (or, resp., plv2) point to the
same device. Note that for this purpose, the LA
can respond with binary information, indicating
whether the two presented encrypted pre-linkage
values point to the same device. There may be
extensions where the MA presents a multitude of
pre-linkage values and the LA reveals information
about their correlation in a controlled manner.
D. Revocation and Blacklisting.
If an EE has been identified as misbehaving during
the Misbehavior Investigation, the EE is revoked and
blacklisted. Next we present a detailed step-by-step
description of the Revocation and Blacklisting process
to identify the linkage seeds and the enrollment certifi-
cate corresponding to a pseudonym certificate. Figure 6
illustrates this process, with Steps 1 and 2 summarizing
the Misbehavior Investigation. Note that some of the
communication messages in the steps below are digitally
signed.
• Step 3. The MA makes a request (signed) to the
PCA to map the linkage value lv of the identified
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pseudonym certificate to the corresponding hash
value of the RA-to-PCA pseudonym certificate re-
quest, all from the PCA’s database. The PCA returns
this value and the hostname of the corresponding
RA to the MA.
• Step 4. The MA sends the hash value of the RA-
to-PCA pseudonym certificate request (signed) to
the RA so that the RA can add the corresponding
enrollment certificate to its blacklist. The RA does
not reveal the enrollment certificate though. The
MA receives the following information from RA,
which is then used by MA to revoke EEs via CRL
entries:
– The hostnames of the LAs involved in creating
the considered linkage values,
– For each LA, an array of LCIs is provided. An
LCI can be used by the LA to look up the linkage
chain and the underlying linkage seed. Multiple
linkage chain identifiers are only used if a de-
vice owns certificates from multiple independent
linkage chains, which is considered an exception.
• Step 5. The MA makes a request to the LA1 (resp.,
the LA2) to map LCI lci1 (resp., lci2) to the linkage
seed ls1(i) (resp., ls2(i)), where i is the currently
valid time period. Both the LAs return the linkage
seed to the MA. Further, each LA provides to MA
its linkage authority ID (la idi). Note that given
a linkage seed ls1(i) and the corresponding la idi,
only the forward linkage seeds (i.e., ls1(j) for j ≥
i) can be calculated, and thus backward privacy of
the revoked device is maintained.
• Step 6. The linkage seeds ls1(i) and ls2(i), are
added to the CRL. The CRL globally states the
current time period i. Further, it states the cor-
responding pair of LA IDs, la id1, la id2. For
efficiency reasons, the CRL may group entries with
the same LA ID pair together to save over-the-air
bytes. Then the MA’s CRLG signs the CRL and
publishes it.
E. Global Misbehavior Detection & Revocation for Non-
pseudonym Certificates
The misbehavior detection and revocation process
shown above is tailored to the case of pseudonym
certificates. This type of certificate is the only type using
linkage values which allows for efficient revocation of a
multitude of certificates. All other types of certificates
allow for a simpler process for misbehavior detection
and revocation. Without linkage values, all revoked cer-
tificates need to be identified separately on the CRL in
order to revoke them. The process reads as follows:
• Step 1. The MA receives misbehavior reports,
including a reported certificate. This certificate does
not contain linkage values.
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• Step 2. The MA presents the certificate to the PCA
and requests the hash of the individual certificate
request from the PCA. The PCA delivers the hash
of the individual certificate request, along with
appropriate host information.
• Step 3. Using the hash of the individual certifi-
cate request, the MA instructs the RA to add the
enrollment certificate to its blacklist. Furthermore,
the MA asks whether there are any non-expired
certificates for this device.
• Step 4. The RA replies with a list of hashes of indi-
vidual certificate requests of non-expired certificates
for the device to be revoked.
• Step 5. Using the additional hashes of the individual
certificate requests, the MA can retrieve the other
non-expired certificates from the PCA.
• Step 6. The MA adds CertIDs (a truncated hash of
the certificate of, say, 8 bytes) of all non-expired
certificates to the CRL.
Note that there are two possible optimizations of the
process described above. First, the PCA could return
only the CertIDs of the predecessor certificates and
successor certificates in Step 5. Second, Step 5 can
be avoided if the RA chooses to store the CertID of
certificates not using linkage values (if certificates are
not encrypted by PCA to the device and RA is able to
read certificates provided to devices).
F. CRL Size and CRL Distribution
The size of the CRL grows linearly with the number
of revoked entities, and some devices will have less
persistent storage than others. It is assumed that all
OEMs will provide at least enough storage for 10,000
entries, which translates to a file size of approximately
400 KB. Therefore, a good CRL design will tag entries
with information that allows devices to identify the
10,000 (or more, depending on local storage) entries
that are of highest priority to them: for example, entries
could be tagged with a location, or with the severity
of misbehavior associated with that device, or with an
indicator that the private keys have been made public.
The final CRL design is still under development; a
preliminary design is provided in IEEE Std 1609.2-
2016, but it does not provide clear mechanisms for
prioritization.
Note that currently there is no way to undo a revo-
cation, and a revoked device can be reinstated only by
repeating the process of bootstrapping, cf. Section V-A.
1) Revocation and Tracking: The value of having
multiple linkage authorities is that it prevents an insider
from gaining information that would enable him to track
a vehicle, while at the same time allowing identification
of a specific device under controlled circumstances.
There are two circumstances where this is useful:
• Revocation: as described above, the LAs enable
efficient revocation via CRLs.
• Misbehavior detection: If part of the misbehavior
detection process is to check whether two messages,
signed with different certificates, origin from the
same device, then the LAs can be used to support
this internal investigation in a privacy preserving
manner. It is still a subject of research to determine
what information LAs should be allowed to provide
to MA, and under which circumstances.
G. CRL Series: Identifying the Authorized Revoker for
a Certificate
Within the system there may be multiple CRL Se-
quences, where a sequence is a temporally ordered set
of CRLs addressing the same group of devices. The
design “pins” each entity in the system to a specific
CRL Sequence and allows different CRL sequences to
be generated by different SCMS components.
There are a number of advantages to this:
• In the real world, jurisdiction over different vehicle
or component types may rest in different authori-
ties; it is therefore sensible to architect the system
in such a way that devices do not have to be
managed by a single central authority. This allows
the appropriate authority to take responsibility for
managing particular applications or fleets, avoiding
a situation where a central CRL issuer might be
reluctant to take responsibility for issuing CRLs
for particular devices due to, for example, concerns
about liability.
• The natural revocation cycle length for different
types of devices may be different. It may be ap-
propriate to update the end-entity CRL daily, but
the SCMS component CRL once a month. Alter-
natively, it might be desirable to publish CRLs
continually as new revocation information becomes
available – this may be the case for CRLs for BSM
senders as there may be a significant volume of
revoked devices. Finally, some fleets, devices, or ap-
plications might hardly ever experience revocation.
In this case they might not have regularly issued
CRLs, but may instead issue a new CRL only when
necessary.
• Given that it makes sense to have different CRL
Sequences, it is sensible to identify which CRL
sequence is relevant to an entity:
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– It improves efficiency of a revocation check when
a message is received from that entity, as only the
most recent CRL in only the relevant sequence
need be checked;
– It removes the risk that an identifier collision
would result in an entity being accidentally re-
voked.
– It ensures that if one CRL generator is compro-
mised, it can only falsely revoke devices that
it was supposed to have jurisdiction over, and
cannot falsely revoke other devices.
Note that although the ability to have different CRL
signers is useful, if there are multiple CRL signers this
potentially increases the communications burden on the
vehicles as they now have to obtain multiple CRLs. This
is addressed by having a central CRL store where all
current CRLs are included in a single file which can be
downloaded by vehicles as they obtain connectivity.
This is done in the IEEE 1609.2 certificate and CRL
structure by use of the Certificate Revocation Authority
CA (CRACA) ID and the CRL Series field. The CRACA
is a CA in the chain of the potentially-revoked entity
that either issues the CRL itself, or directly issues the
CRL Generator certificate. The CRL Series appears in
both the entity’s certificate and the CRL and allows
to distinguish between different CRL Sequences from
the same CRL Generator. This provides unambiguous
identification of the relevant CRL Sequence, similarly
to (but more compactly than) the functionality provided
by the CRLDistributionPoints in X.509 certificates. Fig-
ure 7 shows the CRL series structure for the SCMS
Proof of Concept. There is one main CRL generator. It
manages four CRL Series, covering vehicle pseudonym
certificates (series 1); all SCMS components except those
identified below (series 2); vehicle identification and
RSE application (series 3); and enrollment certificates
(series 4). Additionally, the Root CA manages a CRL
series, series 256, which can be used to revoke the Policy
Generator, CRL Generator, and MA certificates. Note
that for all of these CRL sequences, the Root CA acts
as the CRACA, as it is the CA on the chain of the to-
be-revoked devices; the CRL generator acts simply as an
agent of the root CA and is kept separate so that the root
CA can be kept offline to the greatest extent possible.
VII. CRL PROCESSING AND DISTRIBUTION
To revoke all pseudonym certificates of a given device
from a time period i forward, both seeds ls1(i) and ls2(i),
the linkage IDs la id1, la id2, and timing information i
and jmax are published on the CRL and distributed. A
device that received the CRL forward hashes both seed
values individually, calculates the pre-linkage values of
the current time-period and then XORs the pre-linkage
values to obtain the current linkage value. Figure 8 shows
the information which needs to be published for the
revocation of a given device at time instant i, as well
as the process for finding all possible linkage values for
this device and i′ > i. Note that this mechanism protects
backward-privacy since certificates of revoked devices
cannot be identified for time-periods before the linkage
seeds were published.
For distribution of the CRL, we envision the use
of “collaborative” distribution model as defined in a
preliminary way by [18]. In collaborative distribution,
some devices are initially seeded with CRLs (by RSEs,
by cellular data, or by some other means) and then
distribute the CRLs to their peer devices as they drive
past them in the normal course of events. Devices that
have received the CRL become distributors in their turn,
allowing efficient coverage of the entire system with a
small number of initial seeders. Simulation results are
promising, e.g., [18] shows that the area of Zurich can
be provided with a CRL using a single RSE within a few
hours. However, an interesting open research question
is how best to use relatively limited (6Mbit/s) channel
capacity in the 5.9 GHz band.
VIII. RE-ENROLLMENT
Re-enrollment of a device might be necessary due to
several reasons. We define re-enrollment as either of the
following:
• Reinstatement: A device is reinstated if the origi-
nal enrollment certificate is reinstated by removing
it from the RA’s blacklist.
• Re-bootstrapping: A device is re-bootstrapped if
the device is wiped and then bootstrap is executed
to issue a new enrollment certificate. This is like a
factory reset.
• Re-issuance: A device is reissued if the public key
of the enrollment certificate is reused to issue a
new enrollment certificate. The device keeps all
pseudonym certificates and keeps using the same
butterfly key parameters.
• Re-establishment: A device is re-established if the
device’s integrity can be verified remotely and the
device then requests a new enrollment certificate
using the old enrollment certificate to authenticate
the request.
Note that we strongly suggest to only use re-
bootstrapping and re-establishment but no reinstating or
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re-issuing. Device re-enrollment is useful in the follow-
ing scenarios:
• Change of cryptography: Advances in crypt-
analysis might make it necessary to replace the
underlying cryptographic algorithms. In the next
decades, this will likely be the case to introduce
post-quantum cryptography algorithms. In this case,
devices need to receive updated firmware, ideally
over-the-air, and then request new enrollment cer-
tificates that use the updated cryptographic scheme.
• Device revocation via CRL: If a device is revoked
and is listed on the CRL, only re-bootstrapping is
allowed.
• Enrollment certificate roll-over: It is good prac-
tice and a security requirement in the SCMS to limit
the life-span of enrollment certificates, which mo-
tivates the need for a roll-over to a new enrollment
certificate over-the-air, which is equivalent to re-
establishing an EE. If the current enrollment cer-
tificate has not been revoked, a device can request
a new enrollment certificate. The device creates a
new private/public key pair and includes that public
key in its certificate roll-over request to RA. The
device digitally signs the roll-over request with its
current enrollment certificate. The RA verifies the
request, forwards it to ECA and ECA in turn signs
the requested enrollment containing the new public
key.
• Device revocation due to a revoked ECA: If an
ECA has been revoked such that a device now holds
an invalid enrollment certificate, re-enrollment is
necessary as well. As a standard approach, a de-
vice should be re-bootstrapped. Considering a re-
establishment of devices that hold an enrollment
certificate from a revoked ECA creates the risk to
issue a new enrollment certificate to a malicious de-
vice, if there is no deterministic way to differentiate
between malicious and honest devices. Hence we
strongly recommend re-bootstrapping in a secure
environment of all affected devices.
• Root CA and ICA revocation: If a Root CA cer-
tificate is revoked, it is assumed that a new Root CA
certificate is established by means of electors (see
Section IX) and all relevant components have been
equipped with a new certificate under the new Root
CA certificate. ECAs need to be re-certified, and
permission is given by the SCMS Manager to re-
establish devices that hold an enrollment certificate
issued by a re-certified ECA, if there is evidence
that the ECA has not been compromised. Otherwise
devices need to be re-bootstrapped.
In case of either a Root CA certificate or ICA cer-
tificate revocation the revocation information will
be distributed via an updated CRL. EEs will pick
up the updated CRL, and check, if the certificate is
in the trust chain to their enrollment, pseudonym,
application, or identification certificate. In case of
the enrollment certificate an EE will send a re-
enrollment request to the RA, using their current en-
rollment certificate. RAs receive information from
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the SCMS Manager, which ECAs are re-certified
and will allow devices with an enrollment certifi-
cate signed by re-certified ECAs to request a new
enrollment certificate. The EE needs to request new
pseudonym, application, or identification certificates
with the new enrollment certificate afterwards.
In case only the EE’s pseudonym, application, or
identification are affected by the revoked Root CA
certificate, the EE needs to send new provisioning
requests with the current enrollment certificate to
the RA. RA will stop all pending pre-generation
jobs with the previous PCA certificate and delete
all pre-generated certificates as soon as it receives
the updated CRL.
The case for a revoked ICA is equivalent, except
that it’s not necessary to create a new Root CA cer-
tificate and introduce it to the system via Electors.
IX. ELECTOR-BASED ROOT MANAGEMENT
Given that EEs are able to re-enroll as described in
subsection VIII after a root CA certificate’s validity
period ends or a revocation was necessary and a new root
CA certificate has been established for replacement, how
can an EE start trusting this new root CA certificate? The
trust in an initial root CA certificate is implicit, as it is
installed in a secure environment with out-of-band com-
munication during bootstrapping of the EE. One option
would be to get the EE back to that secure environment
and use out-of-band communication to install the new
root CA certificate. But this is suboptimal due to the
required effort and will render the overall V2X system
partly out-of-order until all EEs have installed the new
certificate.
To manage the root CA certificate over time and
gain resilience against compromises on any level, the
SCMS needs the ability to heal itself, which means to
bring itself into a state where it can endure another
singleton compromise or end of validity period. This
recovery should occur while keeping the EEs operational
whenever possible, that is, capable of sending, receiving
and validating BSMs, and be able to heal the system
hierarchy without requiring physical access to EEs.
Elector-based Root Management as introduced in [27]
is the solution that provides those means by installing
a distributed management schema on top of the SCMS
root CAs.
A. Distributed Management, Electors
A distributed management scheme, like a democracy,
contains within itself the power to replace an established
hierarchy, and does not succumb to a single failure: The
concept of Electors, which together have the power to
change and manage the trust relationships of the system.
The number of electors should be 2n+1, where n is the
number of simultaneous elector expiration/compromises
that can be tolerated.
Like in a democracy the Elector-based Root Man-
agement introduces a Ballot with an Action to endorse
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or revoke a root CA certificate or another elector. The
electors cast Votes by signing the ballot individually.
When a quorum of valid electors voted on the ballot,
the ballot can be trusted by any other component in
the system and the action contained in the ballot can
be executed securely.
The electors are not part of the PKI hierarchy, and
therefore the electors can use a different crypto-system
than the SCMS PKI, in fact each of them can use a
different one. This raises the probability that in case
of a root CA certificate compromise due to a broken
cryptography, the system is still able to heal itself.
The resulting system may have multiple, self-signed
root CA certificates, each of which operates as the top of
their trust chain. Each root CA’s certificate is endorsed
by a ballot with at least a quorum of votes from non-
revoked electors. EEs need to verify the trust chain up
to a root CA certificate, at which point they must verify
that a quorum of non-revoked electors have endorsed that
root CA certificate.
B. Ballots & Actions
Electors operate by signing ballot messages to be
consumed by other SCMS components, including EEs.
These ballots include the following basic set of actions:
Add:
• Endorse root CA certificate
• Endorse elector certificate
Revoke:
• Revoke root CA certificate
• Revoke elector certificate
Each ballot contains only one action, the certificate
that action should be applied to, and multiple signa-
tures of electors. Components, including EEs, know the
quorum and the certificates of the initial set of electors
and therefore can validate the authorization of the action
contained in the ballot.
The SCMS Manager will coordinate the production of
these ballot messages.
C. Structure of Ballots
Each elector shall produce an independent vote in
support of a root or elector endorsement or in support
of a root or elector revocation. All independent Elector
votes will be collected in one ASN.1 structure which is
referred to as a Ballot. The ballot structure shall contain
the following elements:
1) A Sequence of Actions, each containing:
a) The Certificate of the Object of the Action
b) A sequence of Elector Signatures.
Note that the validity period of a ballot is implicitly given
by the validity period of the object of the action.
D. Revocation/Endorsement Impact on EEs
A key consideration in the design of the root manage-
ment system is to maintain secure operation of EEs with-
out requiring recall or manual re-enrollment of individual
devices (as described in section VIII). Table III outlines
the status of EEs through the addition or revocation of
electors and root CAs.
X. ORGANIZATIONAL SEPARATION
Different SCMS components represent different logi-
cal functions. For providing an acceptable level of pri-
vacy for V2V safety communication applications using
BSMs and pseudonym certificates, some distinct logical
functions must be provided by distinct organizations, in
order to prevent a single organization from being able
to determine which pseudonym certificates belong to a
device. This capability would allow an attacker to track
a vehicle by capturing its BSMs.
This section identifies which SCMS components must
be organizationally separate. The general rule is that
two components cannot be run by the same organization
if the combined information held by the components
would allow an insider to determine which pseudonym
certificates belong to a device. This leads to the following
specific requirements for organizational separation:
• PCA and RA: If these two components were run
by one organization, the organization would know
which pseudonym certificates had been issued to
which device. This is because the RA knows the
requests to which certificates correspond, and the
PCA knows the corresponding pseudonym certifi-
cates.
• PCA and one of the LAs: If an organization ran the
PCA and either (or, both) of the LAs, it could link
all pseudonym certificates (from any batch) issued
to any device since LA knows a set of pre-linkage
values that go into the certificate set, and PCA sees
these pre-linkage values at certificate generation
time.
• LA1 and LA2: If an organization ran both the
LAs, it would know all the pre-linkage values and
XOR them opportunistically to obtain the linkage
values, which appear in plaintext in pseudonym cer-
tificates. This would allow identification of which
pseudonym certificates belong to the same device.
• LOP and (RA or MA): The LOP hides the location
from the RA and the MA, respectively, and may not
be combined with any of these components.
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TABLE III
ROOT MANAGEMENT MESSAGE IMPACT ON EES
Action Impact on EE operations
Revocation of an Elector
As long as there are at least three electors with a quorum of two, then one elector may
be removed without impacting operation: The remaining electors are still a quorum
and their endorsements of the root CA certificate would still be valid. A single revoked
elector would not stop operations of any EE. A replacement elector may then be added
back to the system to return to a state with three valid electors. A larger number of
electors may be used to improve the system’s resilience to compromise or failure of
these top-level trust anchors.
Revocation of a Root CA
Revoking a root CA certificate would stop operations of EEs that possess certificates
chaining up to the revoked root CA certificate. Those EEs would need to re-enroll
and be re-provisioned with a different root CA before they could be trusted by other
devices.
Addition of an Elector
A new self-signed elector certificate that is endorsed by a quorum of valid electors can
be trusted by EEs and other SCMS components without the need of returning them to
a secure environment.
In addition, this new elector can endorse existing root CA certificates without the
need for any updates of the existing valid certificates, including the EE’s pseudonym
certificates.
Addition of a Root CA
A new, self-signed root CA certificate that is endorsed by a quorum of valid electors
can be trusted by EEs and other SCMS components without the need of returning them
to a secure environment. EEs can immediately begin to trust messages that chain up
to the new root CA.
• MA and (RA, LA, or PCA): The MA should not
be combined with any of the RA, the LA or the
PCA. If combined, the MA could circumvent re-
strictions during misbehavior investigation and learn
more information than necessary for misbehavior
investigation and revocation purposes.
When other certificate types are generated, no specific
organizational separation is required.
XI. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
We introduced a Security Credential Management
System (SCMS) for V2X communications, with a special
emphasis on V2V safety application communication.
This SCMS design is a leading candidate for the V2X
security backend design in the US. One of the remaining
challenges is to define policies that balance among
security, privacy, and efficiency that will support the
establishment of a nationwide system. The proposed
solution uses five certificate types to cover all identified
V2X application categories. This article focused on V2V
safety communication security and the life-cycle of OBE
pseudonym certificates since this certificate type requires
most consideration in terms of privacy protection and
complexity. The SCMS is designed to scale with the
number of devices and to protect privacy of end-users
against inside and outside attackers by separation of
duties.
Next steps towards an SCMS deployment are as
follows:
• Define an effective and CRL dissemination based
on the concept of Collaborative Distribution [18].
• Large scale test deployments of a proof-of-concept
SCMS.
• Development of misbehavior detection algorithms,
implementation and test of misbehavior reporting,
investigation and detection in a proof-of-concept
implementation.
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